2012 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

5-16-2012

In re: Schering Plough

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012

Recommended Citation
"In re: Schering Plough " (2012). 2012 Decisions. 908.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/908

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
Nos. 10-3046 and 10-3047
_____________
IN RE: SCHERING PLOUGH CORP.
INTRON/TEMODAR CONSUMER CLASS ACTION
Angela Montgomery,
Appellant in No. 10-3046
International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local No. 331
Health & Welfare Trust Fund,
Appellant in No. 10-3047
_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 2-06-cv-05774)
District Judge: Honorable Stanley R. Chesler
_____________
Argued December 15, 2011
Before: SLOVITER, VANASKIE and GREENBERG,
Circuit Judges
(Filed: May 16, 2012)

Donald E. Haviland, Jr., Esq. (Argued)
Michael J. Lorusso, Esq.
Haviland Hughes
111 South Independence Mall East
The Bourse, Suite 1000
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant Angela Montgomery
Stephen G. Grygiel, Esq. (Argued)
John E. Keefe, Jr., Esq.
Stephen T. Sullivan, Jr., Esq.
Keefe Bartels
170 Monmouth Street
Red Bank, NJ 07701
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant International
Brotherhood of Teamsters Local No. 331 Health &
Welfare Trust Fund
Douglas S. Eakeley, Esq.
Natalie J. Kraner, Esq.
Alan S. Modlinger, Esq.
Kristin A. Muir, Esq.
Gavin J. Rooney, Esq. (Argued)
Lowenstein Sandler
65 Livingston Avenue
Roseland, NJ 07068
Counsel for Defendant-Appellee Schering Plough
Corp.
_____________

2

OPINION
_____________
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.
At issue in these consolidated appeals is the standing
of third-party payors of drugs prescribed for ―off-label‖
purposes, i.e., uses not approved by the Food and Drug
Administration (―FDA‖), as well as the standing of individual
patients prescribed drugs for off-label purposes, to pursue
claims against a pharmaceutical company and its affiliated
marketing entities under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (―RICO‖), 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et
seq., the New Jersey RICO statute, N.J.S.A §2C:41-1, et seq.,
as well as other state statutory and common law causes of
action. Both groups of plaintiffs claim that the defendants
pursued illegal marketing campaigns to persuade physicians
to prescribe certain drugs for off-label uses. The District
Court found that both groups of plaintiffs lacked standing
because, inter alia, they did not allege a plausible nexus
between the assailed marketing campaign and the physicians‘
decisions to prescribe certain drugs for off-label use. Having
carefully considered the parties‘ contentions in the context of
the entire record, we agree that dismissal of both actions for
want of standing is warranted. Accordingly, we will affirm
the District Court‘s well-reasoned decisions.
I.
A. The Parties
There are two sets of plaintiffs in these consolidated
appeals. One set of Plaintiffs consists of a putative
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nationwide class of third-party payors (―TPPs‖).1 The other
set of Plaintiffs is comprised of a putative nationwide class of
individual patient-consumers who paid for prescriptions of
certain drugs for off-label uses, with the named class
representative being Angela F. Montgomery.2
Separate
Amended Complaints were filed on behalf of each set of
Plaintiffs. The Defendants common to both Amended
Complaints are the Schering-Plough Corporation, a
manufacturer of pharmaceutical products, and its affiliated
marketing and sales companies, the Schering Sales
Corporation and Schering Corporation. The TPP Amended
Complaint also names as defendants another Schering
subsidiary, Integrated Therapeutics Group, Inc., individual
Schering executives Richard J. Kogan, William K. Heiden,
and Mary Naughton, as well as unnamed individuals (―John
Doe‖ and ―Jane Doe‖ defendants), and unknown business
entities (―ABC Corporations‖), who purportedly participated
in the alleged illegal and false sales and marketing
campaigns. For sake of simplicity, we shall refer to the
1

There are four TPPs named as plaintiffs: the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local No. 331 Health
& Welfare Fund (―Local 331‖), Heavy and General Laborers‘
Local Union 472/172 Welfare Fund, United American
Insurance Company, and Blue Cross Blue Shield of Alabama.
Local 331 is the only third-party payor to appeal. We are thus
concerned only with the standing of Local 331.
2

This action originally included five named patients:
Angela F. Montgomery, Harold Estelle, Beryl A‘Dare
Bratton, Dorothy Bratton, and John Huston. Only Angela F.
Montgomery has continued to pursue this matter. We are
thus concerned only with Montgomery‘s standing.
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Defendants collectively as ―Schering.‖ Both sets of Plaintiffs
assert that they paid for Schering drugs that were ineffective
or unsafe for the off-label uses for which they were
prescribed.
B. FDCA Labeling and Marketing Regulations
The off-label marketing claims are at least partially
predicated on Schering‘s alleged violations of the labeling
and marketing restrictions of the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (―FDCA‖). The FDCA
regulates the manufacturing, marketing and sale of
prescription drugs, and provides that a drug cannot be sold in
interstate commerce unless it is approved by the FDA for the
specific medical use, or ―indication,‖ listed on the drug‘s
labeling. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (―No person shall introduce
or deliver for introduction into interstate commerce any new
drug, unless an approval of an application filed pursuant to
subsection (b) or (j) of this section is effective with respect to
such drug.‖). To obtain FDA approval, drug companies
generally must submit evidence from clinical trials and other
testing that evaluate the drug‘s risks and benefits and
demonstrate that it is safe and effective for all of the
indications ―prescribed, recommended, or suggested‖ on the
drug‘s label. See id. at § 355(d).
Prescription drugs frequently have therapeutic uses
other than their FDA-approved indications. The FDCA,
however, generally prohibits manufacturers from marketing,
advertising, or otherwise promoting drugs for such
unapproved or ―off-label‖ uses. See 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) and
(d) (prohibiting manufacturers from introducing a drug into
interstate commerce with an intent that it be used for an off-
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label purchase, or by ―misbranding‖ it by including
information about unapproved uses on its label).
Because the FDCA does not regulate the practice of
medicine, physicians may lawfully prescribe drugs for offlabel uses. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531
U.S. 341, 350 (2001) (recognizing off-label usage as ―an
accepted and necessary corollary of the FDA‘s mission to
regulate in this area without directly interfering with the
practice of medicine.‖); Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202
F.3d 331, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (―A physician may prescribe a
legal drug to serve any purpose that he or she deems
appropriate, regardless of whether the drug has been approved
for that use by the FDA.‖). Thus, there is a certain
―asymmetry‖ in the regulation of off-label uses: while
physicians may lawfully prescribe drugs for off-label uses,
the FDCA generally prohibits manufacturers from marketing
these uses to physicians. See id. at 332-33 (referring to the
FDCA‘s ―asymmetrical—if not necessarily inconsistent—
regulatory treatment‖ of off-label uses). Indeed, the FDCA‘s
regulatory regime prohibits manufacturers from directly
advertising off-label uses, such as through labeling claims or
explicit statements made by sales representatives. Moreover,
it is also unlawful for manufacturers to engage in certain
indirect methods of off-label marketing. For example, in
certain circumstances it is unlawful for manufacturers to
sponsor continuing medical education (―CME‖) courses that
focus on off-label uses. The FDCA does, however, permit
manufacturers to distribute information about off-label uses in
certain limited circumstances. See id. at 333.
The drugs involved in these consolidated appeals (the
―Subject Drugs‖) are certain oncology and Hepatitis drugs,
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including Intron®-A (―Intron-A‖), PEG-Intron® (―PEGIntron‖), Rebetol® (―Rebetol‖) and Rebetron® (―Rebetron‖)
(collectively the ―Intron Franchise Drugs‖), and Temodar®
(―Temodar‖). The FDA has approved these drugs for specific
purposes.
C. Criminal Case Against Schering
In June 2001, the FDA‘s Division of Drug Marketing,
Advertising, and Communications sent Schering Sales a letter
notifying it that the FDA had ―identified various promotional
activities that [were] in violation of the [FDCA] and its
implementing regulations.‖ (Information at 12-16, United
States v. Schering Sales Corp., No. 06-CR-10250 (D. Mass.
Aug. 29, 2006)). The letter cited a May 2001 American
Society of Clinical Oncology Annual Meeting in San
Francisco at which the FDA witnessed Schering sales
representatives give purportedly ―false or misleading efficacy
information about Temodar to visitors at the commercial
exhibit hall booth,‖ and ―promote[] Temodar for the
unapproved use in first line therapy of anaplastic
astrocytoma.‖ (Id. at 12-13). The FDA‘s letter requested that
Schering ―immediately cease making such violative
statements and any other promotional activities or materials
for Temodar that make the same or similar claims or
presentations.‖ (Id. at 13).
In August 2006, the United States Attorney for the
District of Massachusetts charged Schering Sales with
conspiracy to make false statements to the federal
government, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. (Id. at 12-16).
The Government‘s one-count Information alleged that
―Schering Sales and its co-conspirators knowingly and
willfully made material false statements to the FDA.‖ (Id. at
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8). It stated that Schering Sales‘ response to the FDA June
2001 letter specifically asserted that Schering‘s home office
had ―aggressively pursued sales of Intron A and Temodar for
unapproved uses‖ through numerous methods, including
training the sales force to seek off-label sales, requiring the
sales force to ―create business plans that emphasized detailed
promotional goals to obtain off-label sales,‖ and
compensating the sales force partly on their success in
achieving off-label sales. (Id.)
Schering Sales pleaded guilty to the one-count
Information pursuant to a written Settlement Agreement.
(See Amended Judgment, United States v. Schering Sales
Corp., 06-CR-10250 (D. Mass. Feb 7, 2007)). Under the
Settlement Agreement, Schering Sales agreed to pay fine of
$180 million. (Id.) It also agreed to pay $255 million to
resolve civil claims that it defrauded U.S. Government health
benefit programs, including Medicare, Medicaid, and the
Veteran‘s Administration. (Id.)
D. Consolidated Putative Class Action
Following Schering‘s settlement with the Government,
various civil suits were filed across the country by consumer
plaintiffs who were prescribed, consumed, and paid for the
drugs, and by TPPs who paid for the Subject Drugs
prescribed to their plan members. The Judicial Panel on
Multi-District Litigation ordered the cases to be transferred to
the District of New Jersey, where Schering is incorporated,
and consolidated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
The District Court directed that the various actions
transferred to it be consolidated for pretrial management and
that a consolidated complaint on behalf of all plaintiffs be
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filed. In December 2007, the nine named plaintiffs (the four
TPPs and five patients identified in footnotes 1 and 2, supra)
filed a Consolidated Class Action Complaint (the
―Complaint‖) on behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated, alleging that the Defendants engaged in illegal
promotion of the Subject Drugs in violation of the federal and
New Jersey RICO statutes (Counts I and II), and the New
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (―NJCFA‖), N.J. Stat. Ann. §
56:8-1, et seq. (Count III). The Complaint also asserted
common law claims for unjust enrichment (Count IV); civil
conspiracy (Count V); fraud (Count VI); negligent
misrepresentation (Count VII); aiding and abetting breach of
fiduciary duty (Count VIII); and equitable accounting (Count
IX).
In an Order and Opinion issued on July 10, 2009, the
District Court dismissed the Complaint in its entirety pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), for failure to
state a claim and lack of standing, but granted leave to file an
amended complaint.
In re Schering-Plough Corp.
Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, Slip Copy, 2009 WL
2043604 (D.N.J. 2009) (―Schering I‖). The Court found that
the Complaint lacked sufficient factual allegations to
plausibly assert an injury-in-fact that was cognizable under
any of the asserted causes of action and fairly traceable to the
Defendants‘ alleged misconduct.
In September 2009, two separate Amended Complaints
were filed, one by Montgomery and the other by the four TPP
plaintiffs identified in footnote 1, supra. Montgomery filed
an Amended Civil Consumer Class Action Complaint
(―MAC‖) individually and on behalf of a putative nationwide
class of similarly situated patient-consumers who purchased,
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were reimbursed, and/or paid for any of the Subject Drugs
during the class period. The MAC asserted violations of the
Washington State Consumer Protection Act, Wash. Rev.
Code § 19.86.010, et seq. (Count I), and the consumer
protection statutes of the remaining 49 states, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico (Count II), as well as claims of
civil conspiracy (Count III), aiding and abetting breach of
fiduciary duty (Count IV), and unjust enrichment (Count V).
The TPP plaintiffs filed an Amended Consolidated
Class Action Complaint (―TPP Complaint‖) on behalf of a
proposed class of health and welfare funds and other TPPs
who paid any portion of the purchase price for the Subject
Drugs during the class period. The TPP Complaint asserted
violations of the federal and New Jersey RICO statutes,
(Counts I and II), in addition to common law claims for
intentional interference with contractual relations (Count III)
and unjust enrichment (Count IV).
The Plaintiffs‘ Amended Complaints allege that
Schering engaged in a widespread marketing campaign that
employed illegal techniques to promote prescriptions of the
Subject Drugs for off-label uses. They contend that these
illegal practices included: (1) promoting certain of the Subject
Drugs for off-label uses; (2) using false and misleading
statements to promote certain of the Subject Drugs as
effective, safe, and cost-effective for off-label uses; and (3)
providing physicians with disguised and undisguised bribes,
kickbacks and other illegal inducements to encourage them to
prescribe the Subject Drugs for off-label uses.
Plaintiffs claim that Schering used a variety of
methods to effectuate this marketing scheme and disseminate
its false claims. For example, they allege that Schering
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trained its sales representatives to mislead medical
professionals about the Subject Drugs‘ effectiveness for offlabel uses by distorting contrary scientific data and the results
of clinical studies. They also claim that the Schering sales
force promoted off-label prescriptions by disseminating false
and misleading statements in private sales meetings with
doctors, at medical conferences, and in CME programs.
Plaintiffs also assert that Schering promoted these off-label
prescriptions through both disguised and undisguised bribes
to induce doctors to prescribe the Subject Drugs.
Plaintiffs aver that Schering‘s unlawful marketing
practices caused physicians to prescribe the Subject Drugs for
off-label uses instead of equally effective alternative
treatments that were approved for the prescribed uses or no
medication at all. They assert that these marketing techniques
led to a significant increase in prescriptions of the Subject
Drugs for off-label uses, and contend that this caused the
Plaintiffs ―ascertainable loss‖ because they paid ―hundreds of
millions, if not billions, of dollars for the Subject Drugs that
they otherwise would not have paid.‖
On October 28, 2009, Schering filed separate motions
to dismiss each Amended Complaint. On June 9, 2010, the
District Court issued separate Orders and Opinions
(collectively, ―Schering II‖) granting both motions. The
Court dismissed the TPP Complaint because it failed to
adequately plead the injury-in-fact and causation elements
required to establish standing to assert its RICO, interference
with contractual relations, and unjust enrichment claims. The
Court also held that even if the Complaint had established
standing to pursue non-RICO claims, its two common law
claims of interference with contractual relations and unjust
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enrichment would still fail under Rule 12(b)(6). The Court
dismissed the MAC for failure to show a causal link between
Montgomery‘s alleged injury and Schering‘s alleged
misconduct.
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the District
Court‘s dismissal of the Amended Complaints. See United
States ex rel. Atkinson v. Pa. Shipbuilding Co., 473 F.3d 506,
514 (3d Cir. 2007) (review of dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) is plenary); Howard
Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237,
246 (3d Cir. 2010) (review of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is
plenary).
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), a court must grant a
motion to dismiss if it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear
a claim. ―A motion to dismiss for want of standing is . . .
properly brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), because standing
is a jurisdictional matter.‖ Ballentine v. United States, 486
F.3d 806, 810 (3d Cir. 2007). In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(1)
motion, a court must first determine whether the movant
presents a facial or factual attack. Mortensen v. First Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). In
reviewing a facial challenge, which contests the sufficiency of
the pleadings, ―the court must only consider the allegations of
the complaint and documents referenced therein and attached
thereto, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.‖ Gould
Elec. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000).
The Defendants‘ Rule 12(b)(1) motions are properly
understood as facial attacks because they contend that the
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Amended Complaints lack sufficient factual allegations to
establish standing.
In evaluating whether a complaint adequately pleads
the elements of standing, courts apply the standard of
reviewing a complaint pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim: ―Court[s] must accept as
true all material allegations set forth in the complaint, and
must construe those facts in favor of the nonmoving party.‖
Ballentine, 486 F.3d at 810 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 501 (1975)); see also Baldwin v. Univ. of Pittsburgh
Med. Ctr., 636 F.3d 69, 73 (3d Cir. 2011) (―A dismissal for
lack of statutory standing is effectively the same as a
dismissal for failure to state a claim.‖). The Supreme Court
most recently explained this standard in Bell Atl. Corp v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129
S.Ct. 1937 (2009): ―[A] complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‗state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.‘‖ Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). We have outlined a three-step
approach to evaluating whether a complaint satisfies this
standard:
First, the court must ―tak[e] note of the
elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.‖
Second, the court should identify allegations
that, ―because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption
of truth.‖ Finally, ―where there are wellpleaded factual allegations, a court should
assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement for relief.‖
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Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir.
2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947-50) (footnote
omitted).
While the plausibility standard does not impose a
―probability requirement,‖ it does demand ―more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.‖ Iqbal, 129
S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Pursuant to
Iqbal‘s clarification of the plausibility determination as a
―context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense,‖ id., this
Court has found that ―[s]ome claims require more factual
explication than others to state a plausible claim for relief.‖
West Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85,
98 (3d Cir. 2010). We have reasoned that, ―[f]or example, it
generally takes fewer factual allegations to state a claim for
simple battery than to state a claim for antitrust conspiracy.‖
Id.
―A complaint has to ‗show‘ such an entitlement with
its facts.‖ Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d
Cir. 2009). With respect to 12(b)(1) motions in particular,
―[t]he plaintiff must assert facts that affirmatively and
plausibly suggest that the pleader has the right he claims
(here, the right to jurisdiction), rather than facts that are
merely consistent with such a right.‖ Stalley v. Catholic
Health Initiatives, 509 F.3d 517, 521 (8th Cir. 2007).
III.
Article III of the Constitution limits the scope of the
Federal judicial power to the adjudication of ―cases‖ or
―controversies.‖ U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. This ―bedrock
requirement,‖ Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for
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Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982),
protects the system of separated powers and respect for the
coequal branches by restricting the province of the judiciary
to ―decid[ing] on the rights of individuals.‖ Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). Indeed, ―‗[n]o
principle is more fundamental to the judiciary‘s proper role in
our system of government than the constitutional limitation of
federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.‘‖
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997) (quoting Simon v.
E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976)).
The courts have developed several justicability
doctrines to enforce the case-or-controversy requirement, and
―perhaps the most important of these doctrines‖ is the
requirement that ―a litigant have ‗standing‘ to invoke the
power of a federal court.‖ Allen v. Wright, 486 U.S. 737, 750
(1984). ―[T]he standing question is whether the plaintiff has
‗alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy‘ as to warrant his invocation of federal-court
jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial
powers on his behalf.‖ Warth, 422 U.S. at 498-99 (citing
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
The plaintiff bears the burden of meeting the
―irreducible constitutional minimum‖ of Article III standing
by establishing three elements:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury
in fact—an invasion of a legally protected
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of—the injury has to be fairly
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traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant, and not the result of the independent
action of some third party not before the court.
Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by
a favorable decision.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)
(internal quotations, alterations, and citations omitted).
We have recognized that of the three required elements
of constitutional standing, ―the injury-in-fact element is often
determinative.‖ Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of Readington, 555
F.3d 131, 138 (3d Cir. 2009). To satisfy this requirement, the
alleged injury must be ―particularized,‖ in that it ―must affect
the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.‖ Lujan, 504
U.S. at 560 n.1. ―[T]he ‗injury in fact‘ test requires more than
an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the party
seeking review be himself among the injured.‖ Id. at 563
(quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35
(1972)). The injury must also be ―an invasion of a legally
protected interest.‖ Id. at 560. Since ―standing is not
dispensed in gross,‖ Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 n.6
(1996), a plaintiff who raises multiple causes of action ―must
demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press.‖
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006).
Furthermore, ―the standing inquiry requires careful judicial
examination of a complaint's allegations to ascertain whether
the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the
particular claims asserted.‖ Allen, 468 U.S. at 752.
A. Local 331
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The District Court dismissed the TPP Complaint in its
entirety for lack of standing and failure to state a claim.
Local 331 contends that the Court applied the wrong standard
of review and consequently erred in finding that the TPP
Complaint fails to adequately plead facts to establish an
injury-in-fact that is fairly traceable to the Defendants‘
alleged misconduct. Local 331 also argues that the Court
erred in finding that it failed to state a claim for tortious
interference with contract and unjust enrichment. We address
each of these arguments in turn.
Counts I and II of the TPP Complaint assert causes of
action under the federal and New Jersey RICO statutes,
respectively. The federal RICO statute creates a civil remedy,
including an award of treble damages, costs, and attorneys
fees, for ―any person injured in his business or property‖ by a
violation of one of RICO‘s substantive provisions. 18 U.S.C.
§1964(c). Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), it is unlawful for
―‗any person‘ who is employed by or associated with ‗any
enterprise‘ affecting interstate commerce to ‗participate,
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise‘s
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.‘‖ Genty v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 906 (3d Cir. 1991)
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)). The RICO statute defines
racketeering activity by a list of crimes, or ―predicate
offenses,‖ including several state felonies such as murder,
kidnapping, and bribery that are punishable by imprisonment
for more than one year, and federal crimes such as bribery,
mail fraud and wire fraud. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
The TPP Complaint also alleges violations of the New
Jersey RICO statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:41-4(c), based on
the same alleged enterprises, predicate offenses, and pattern
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of racketeering activity as those alleged in support of the
federal RICO claims. (TPP Compl. ¶¶396-403.) Since the
TPP Complaint‘s federal and New Jersey RICO claims
parallel each other, and because the two RICO statutes are
intended to be coextensive, we follow the District Court‘s
approach and analyze the two claims concurrently. (See A.
86, n.3); see also Cetel v. Kirwan Fin. Grp., Inc., 460 F.3d
494, 510 (3d Cir. 2006) (―[T]he New Jersey Supreme Court
believed the New Jersey RICO statute was and should be
consistent with the federal RICO statute.‖) (citing State v.
Ball, 661 A.2d 251 (N.J. 1995)).
In addition to meeting the constitutional standing
requirements, ―plaintiffs seeking recovery under RICO must
satisfy additional standing criterion set forth in section
1964(c) of the statute.‖ Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472,
482 (3d Cir. 2000). Section 1964(c) confers standing upon
―any person injured in his business or property by reason of a
violation of section 1962 of this chapter . . .‖ 18 U.S.C. §
1964(c). We have interpreted this language as requiring
RICO plaintiffs to ―make two related but analytically distinct
threshold showings‖ to establish standing: ―(1) that the
plaintiff suffered an injury to business or property; and (2)
that the plaintiff‘s injury was proximately caused by the
defendant‘s violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962.‖ Maio, 221 F.3d
at 483.
The District Court in this case conducted an extensive
analysis of the TPP Complaint to determine if it complied
with the RICO standing requirement of alleging injury to
business or property. It concluded that the TPP Complaint
did not allege a concrete injury to TPP business or property
because it did not contain sufficient allegations that they paid
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for prescriptions of the drugs that were actually ineffective or
otherwise worth less than what they paid for them. On
appeal, the parties focused their arguments, in significant part,
on debating this conclusion.
Although we agree with the District Court‘s
conclusion in this respect, we need not reach the question of
standing under RICO. It is well-established that a plaintiff‘s
Article III standing is a prerequisite for the federal courts to
decide the merits of a suit. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 109-10 (1998). Therefore,
prior to considering whether Local 331 has standing to bring
a RICO claim, we must determine whether it has Article III
standing to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court. Because we
find that Local 331 has not established that its alleged injury
is fairly traceable to Schering‘s alleged wrongful conduct, we
conclude that the Complaint was properly dismissed for lack
of Article III standing.
The District Court held that the TPP Complaint fails to
sufficiently allege facts to establish that the plaintiffs‘ offlabel purchases of the Subject Drugs—―assuming one were to
constitute injury-in-fact‖—is fairly traceable to Schering‘s
allegedly unlawful marketing practices, and ―specifically to
misrepresentations about the [drugs] and/or to conduct
characterized as bribery.‖ (A. 95.) On appeal, Local 331
argues that if the Court had ―properly applied [the causation]
standard to the plausibility test, it would have determined that
there is a traceable connection from Local 331‘s injuries to
the Defendant‘s illegal marketing scheme.‖ (Local 331 Br. at
18.)
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We limit our analysis to the injury and causation
theories that Local 331 raises on appeal.3 In the Statement of
Case section of its Brief, Local 331 mentions three distinct
injuries. First, it paid for off label prescriptions that were
ineffective. Second, it paid for off label prescriptions when
less expensive but equally effective medication was available.
And third, it ―paid for elevated drug prices that recouped the
costs of Schering‘s illegal marketing.‖ (Local 331 Br. At 4.)
The argument section of its Brief, however, is limited to
economic loss based on paying for ineffective drugs.
Accordingly, we further limit our analysis to the question of
whether the TPP complaint alleges a causal link between the
challenged conduct and the injury that Local 331 actually
argues on appeal.
On appeal, Local 331 defends its standing to sue in
large part on the basis of drug purchases made by the other
TPP Plaintiffs. It cites allegations that the Defendants made
false claims about Temodar and Intron-A, and the other TPP
Plaintiffs‘ purchases of those drugs for off-label indications.
(Local 331 Br. at 14-17.) Such allegations are unhelpful to
Local 331, which does not allege that it ever paid for a
Temodar or Intron-A prescription. See Lewis v. Casey, 518
U.S. 343, 347 (1996) (requiring named plaintiffs in a putative
class action to allege ―that they personally have been injured,
not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified
members of the class . . . .‖). Accordingly, we will assess
whether the TPP Complaint contains sufficient factual
3

We, of course, have no jurisdiction to decide the
standing of those TPP Plaintiffs who have not appealed. See
Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 317 (1988);
Nocula v. UGS Corp., 520 F.3d 719, 725 (7th Cir. 2008).
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allegations to confer standing upon Local 331 based upon its
alleged purchases.
According to the TPP Complaint, Local 331‘s
damages are limited to two prescriptions of Rebetol:
Member Kraft and Member Maurone were both
prescribed Rebetol during the Class Period
which were paid for in large part by Local 331.
Upon information and belief, these prescriptions
were written for off-label uses by physicians
improperly influenced by the false and
misleading statements, bribes, and other
dishonest inducements brought to bear by
Defendants‘ illegal off-label marketing scheme.
(TPP Compl. ¶21.)4 Accordingly, to establish standing, Local
331 must allege facts showing a causal relationship between
the alleged injury—payments for Rebetol that was ineffective
or unsafe for the use for which it was prescribed—and
Schering‘s alleged wrongful conduct.
To show the requisite causal connection, Local 331
must allege sufficient facts to plausibly support ―a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained
4

Local 331 claims that the TPP Complaint ―alleged
with requisite specificity that [Local 331] paid for Intron
Franchise Drugs like Rebetol.‖ (Local 331 Reply at 9)
(emphasis added). However, Local 331 does not cite any
portion of the TPP Complaint that states that Local 331 paid
for any Intron Franchise Drugs other than two Rebetol
prescriptions. (See Local 331 Br. at 15, citing ¶¶ 19, 20, 21,
117, 127, 128).
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of—the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged
action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent
action of some third party not before the court.‖ Lujan, 504
U.S. at 560. In other words, the Amended Complaint must
allege facts that plausibly support a causal connection
between Local 331‘s injury-in-fact and Schering‘s allegedly
illegal marketing or bribery schemes.
In arguing that the TPP Complaint meets this burden,
Local 331 essentially repeats the reasoning that the District
Court rejected. Specifically, it states that the TPP Complaint
alleges both ―an overwhelming and reprehensible pattern of
deceit by the defendants,‖ including false marketing and
illegal inducements to doctors, and that this scheme was
aimed at the TPPs. (Local 331 Br. at 18-19.) Local 331
refers to allegations that Schering ―falsely marketed the
Intron Franchise Drugs as efficacious‖ for off-label uses, but
cites only to paragraphs that discuss Intron-A. (See TPP
Compl. ¶¶178, 181, 182.) Likewise, Local 331 argues that
Schering paid doctors to prescribe the drugs to patients who
did not need them, but cites only to paragraphs referring to
Intron-A, Temodar, or Rebetron. (See TPP Compl. ¶¶15-16,
18, 36, 317-60, 278-89); (Local 331 Br. at 19). Local 331
apparently believes that these allegations are an adequate
basis to conclude that, but-for Schering‘s illegal conduct that
increased off-sale prescriptions, ―Local 331 either would not
have had to pay for them, or would not have had to pay for
them at increased prices over readily-available therapies.‖ (Id.
at 19.)
Local 331‘s suggestion that the claims about the other
drugs are what caused the doctors to prescribe Rebetol for
off-label uses is inadequate to establish causation. Local 331
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claims that the allegations about the other Subject Drugs,
paired with the fact that ―Schering alone marketed Rebetol,‖
together reasonably support the inference that ―discovery will
almost certainly confirm‖ that Schering also made ―false
statements about all the drugs described in the Complaint.‖
(Local 331 Reply at 11.) Local 331 must allege facts
sufficient to show that the Rebetol which it paid for was
prescribed to its members for ineffective off-label uses
because of Schering‘s alleged misconduct. There are no
averments that come close to satisfying this standard. It is
pure conjecture to conclude that because Schering‘s
misconduct caused other doctors to write prescriptions for
ineffective off-label uses for other products, Local 331 ended
up paying for two prescriptions for Rebetol due to the same
kind of misconduct. Accordingly, Local 331 has failed to
show the requisite causal relationship between the alleged
misconduct and its alleged injury. Therefore, dismissal for
lack of standing is warranted.5
B. Montgomery
Montgomery, a consumer of Rebetol and PEG-Intron,
brought the MAC on behalf of a putative nationwide class of
consumers of the Subject Drugs. The MAC alleges facts
5

The District Court also held that the failure to allege
an injury-in-fact traceable to the alleged misconduct
compelled the conclusion that the TPP Plaintiffs lacked
standing to assert the common law tort claims of interference
with contractual relations and unjust enrichment. We concur.
Accordingly, there is no need to address the question of
whether Local 331 alleged viable claims for interference with
contractual relations or unjust enrichment.
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particular to her experience and use of two of the Subject
Drugs, as well as the various legal theories pursued on behalf
of the consumer plaintiffs.
Montgomery suffered from Hepatitis C, a viral liver
infection, and after tests conducted in 1999 showed that she
was asymptomatic, her physician, Dr. Jeffrey R. Willis,
decided not to prescribe her a combination therapy of Rebetol
and Intron-A. At a follow-up visit in September 2001, Dr.
Willis recommended a different treatment plan,6 even though
Montgomery was still asymptomatic. A few months after this
consultation, Dr. Willis prescribed Montgomery the PEGIntron and Rebetol combination therapy, also called the
―PEG-Intron Combination Therapy.‖ (MAC ¶75.)
The MAC avers that at the time she was prescribed the
Subject Drugs, they were only approved for patients with
6

The District Court observed an apparent
inconsistency in the MAC regarding which drugs Dr. Willis
decided not to prescribe in 1999—Intron-A and Rebetol,
according to introductory parts of the MAC—and the drugs
he decided to prescribe in 2001—Rebetol and PEG-Intron.
(MAC ¶23.) The Court drew the ―reasonable inference that
the treatment discussed in 1999 involved Rebetol and/or
Intron-A, but not PEG-Intron‖ based on other information in
the MAC. It also stated: ―despite the [MAC‘s] assertion that
the ‗same drugs‘ that Dr. Willis had rejected as unsuited to
Montgomery‘s condition in 1999 were under consideration in
2001, the records attached to the [MAC] and specifically
referenced in paragraph 29 state that Dr. Willis recommended
in 2001 that Montgomery receive . . . PEG-Intron, not Intron
A.‖ (A. 109-110.)
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compensated liver disease, and that since she was healthy and
did not need treatment, she suffered from the serious side
effects of the drugs and lost weeks of work due to these side
effects. The MAC further claims that Dr. Willis changed his
mind about her treatment plan because of Schering‘s
improper marketing of the Rebetol/PEG-Intron combination
therapy. Specifically, it alleges: ―Dr. Willis‘ new plan for
Mrs. Montgomery‘s treatment for her asymptomatic Hepatitis
C evidences that he was subjected to the marketing and sales
scheme by Schering alleged in this Amended Complaint.‖
(MAC ¶30.)
The MAC reaches this conclusion based on the alleged
facts that: (1) due to Schering‘s off-label marketing
techniques, Dr. Willis mistakenly believed that the
combination therapy was the standard treatment for
Montgomery‘s condition; (2) Dr. Willis prescribed the
combination therapy before sending Montgomery for two
tests that he suggested were necessary before beginning the
treatment; (3) Dr. Willis received misinformation from a
nurse on his staff who was believed to be a Schering-paid
nurse.
The MAC contains extensive factual allegations
regarding the types of improper marketing techniques that
Schering used, which Montgomery alleges must have
influenced Dr. Willis between 1999, when he declined to
prescribe her the drugs, and 2001, when he changed his
treatment plan. The MAC reasserts many of the same
allegations about Schering‘s techniques alleged in the TPP
Complaint. The MAC also incorporates by reference all of
the factual allegations made in a Qui Tam action brought
against Schering in the District of Massachusetts, and the
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allegations in the Criminal Information, discussed above, to
which Schering pleaded guilty. (MAC ¶¶ 99-101.) The
allegations include claims about Schering‘s scheme for
providing kickbacks to doctors for prescribing the drugs, false
promotional claims made by sales representatives, and the
placement of a Schering-paid nurse on Dr. Willis‘ staff. The
MAC further alleges that Montgomery ―would not have been
prescribed and would not have paid for such a costly,
noxious, and dangerous medication cocktail had she known
all the facts that were concealed by Defendants and her
doctors . . . .‖ (MAC ¶¶ 4, 5.)
The Defendants moved to dismiss the MAC under
Rule 12(b)(1). The District Court dismissed the MAC for
lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), finding that it failed
to establish a sufficient nexus between her alleged injury and
Schering‘s alleged misconduct.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court first found that
Montgomery had alleged an adequate injury-in-fact for her
claims under the Washington Consumer Protection Act and
various common law theories. The District Court held,
however, that her ―standing to bring suit founders on her
inability to establish any nexus between her purported
injury—be it the needless purchase of the Rebetol/PEGIntron, the side-effects she claims to have suffered and/or the
lost work time—and the wrongful conduct in which Schering
was allegedly engaged.‖ (A. 117.) Montgomery‘s theory that
the Defendants injured her is premised on whether Dr. Willis
shifted his opinion about the appropriate treatment plan due to
Schering‘s marketing practices. The District Court found that
the MAC ―fails to provide any factual allegations that would
support [this] conclusion.‖ (A. 118.)
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On appeal, Montgomery challenges the Court‘s
dismissal of the MAC on several grounds. She argues that
the Court improperly failed to consider certain factual
allegations, some of which she claims establish the necessary
causal link. Moreover, with respect to the factual allegations
that the Court did consider, Montgomery argues that it
applied an improper standard in rejecting those allegations as
inadequate, and claims that when reviewed under the proper
standard, they do adequately allege a causal nexus.
Montgomery first challenges the District Court‘s
decision on the ground that it erred in not fully considering
―the entirety of the record‖ and taking all factual allegations
as true. Montgomery notes that the MAC ―incorporates
several other documents that set forth in great detail—beyond
the extraordinary detail contained in the complaint itself—the
nature and extent of Schering‘s alleged unfair deceptive acts
and practices.‖ (Montgomery Br. at 25.) These documents
include: (1) factual averments based on the personal
knowledge of three former Schering employees in their
related qui tam case filed in the District of Massachusetts
(incorporated in the MAC at ¶105); (2) factual allegations
about the Subject Drugs detailed in the related TPP Amended
Complaint (incorporated in the MAC at n 1, A. 987); (3) the
Criminal Information to which Schering pleaded guilty
(incorporated in the MAC at ¶101); (4) the factual averments
in the Settlement Agreement in the criminal case
(incorporated in the MAC at ¶102); and (5) the Corporate
Integrity Agreement and addendum to the same in the
criminal case (incorporated in the MAC at ¶103).
(Montgomery Br. at 25-26.) Montgomery asserts that ―it is
not clear from the district court‘s opinion that it took proper
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account of these documents, and the substantial facts
contained therein, in its ruling.‖ (Id. at 26.)
In regard to these documents, the District Court stated:
Plaintiff apparently believes that somehow,
through the incorporation of allegations made in
other proceedings, such as the False Claims Act
action filed by three qui tam relators, she can
pursue her own relief against Schering. The
irreducible minimum of Article III standing,
however, requires Montgomery to demonstrate
that she, personally, has suffered a concrete
injury, that her injury can be traced to
Schering‘s misconduct and that it is capable of
redress by the Court.
(A. 120.) This statement suggests that the District Court did
not permit Montgomery to rely on factual allegations that
pertain to the standing of other parties in order to establish her
own standing. The Court also stated that it did not ignore
those documents: ―Assuming Schering engaged in all of the
marketing practices detailed in [the MAC] and in documents
incorporated by reference, and assuming that the practices
might be deemed unlawful, none of the factual allegations she
makes establish the required nexus between her injury and
Schering‘s actions.‖ (A. 120-21.)
It is thus clear that the District Court did not ignore the
documents that Montgomery sought to incorporate by
reference in her Amended Complaint. It is also clear that the
District Court properly concluded that the averments of
misconduct did not support a non-conjectural conclusion that
Dr. Willis had been induced by such misconduct to order the
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PEG-Intron Combination Therapy. Moreover, as a general
matter, even if the Court did decline to consider some of these
documents, this was not necessarily an error. Under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2), a complaint should set forth a ―short and plain
statement‖ of the claim to relief. Plaintiffs cannot be
permitted to incorporate an endless series of external
documents into a complaint simply ―by reference‖ to them, as
this would lead to an impossible task for defendants in filing
their answers, and for courts in reviewing the sufficiency of
complaints. In any event, to the extent that Montgomery
specifically claims that this alleged failure to consider
particular allegations in the incorporated documents has
prejudiced her—that is, that such allegations would have
cured any of the deficiencies in stating causation—we discuss
those arguments infra.
To establish standing, the MAC sought to allege a
causal nexus between Dr. Willis‘ decision to prescribe the
drugs to Montgomery, and the Defendants‘ alleged fraudulent
marketing and bribery schemes. The District Court held that
the MAC failed to adequately allege any connection between
Schering‘s alleged bribery scheme and Montgomery‘s
experience. The Court explained that the MAC ―lacks any
allegation either directly accusing or even plausibly
suggesting that . . . Dr. Willis received [illegal]
remunerations.‖ (A. 120.) The Court also rejected the
MAC‘s allegation about Dr. Willis‘s involvement in a clinical
trial:
In the case of Mrs. Montgomery and other
asymptomatic Hepatitis C patients at [Dr.
Willis‘ practice], upon information and belief
based upon the evidence of record, it is alleged
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that Defendants engaged Dr. Willis in a phony
clinical trial respecting Rebetron Combination
Therapy beginning shortly after the August
2001 FDA approval letter issued.
(MAC ¶93.)
The Court found this allegation inadequate because it
was ―conclusory.‖ (A. 120.) Even ―assum[ing] the truth of
fact asserted,‖ and ―credit[ing] the allegation that Dr. Willis
was involved in a clinical trial,‖ the Court refused to ―credit
the bald assertion that the trial was ‗phony,‘ presumably
meaning that Dr. Willis was not actually gathering data and
studying patients. . . but [was only a] subterfuge for collecting
payments from Schering for prescribing the drugs being
studied.‖ (A. 120.) It rejected this assertion because
―[n]othing in the [MAC] supports this characterization.‖ (A.
120.)
On appeal, Montgomery argues that the Court wrongly
refused to accept this allegation as true. In our view, even if
we found these arguments to be meritorious, they are still
unavailing. Even if we accepted the MAC‘s allegation that
Dr. Willis was involved in a ―phony‖ clinical trial for
Rebetron Combination Therapy, this fact does not establish
the necessary causal connection between Schering‘s
misconduct and Montgomery‘s injury, because she was not
prescribed the Rebetron Combination Therapy. To the
contrary, she was prescribed the PEG-Intron Combination
Therapy, a combination of Rebetol and another longer-lasting
form of interferon, PEG-Intron. (See MAC ¶¶23, 64-66, 74.)
Thus, as Schering observes: ―Dr. Willis‘s thoughts or
clinical experiences with that drug therapy are of no moment
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here.‖ (Schering Br. at 26.) Notably, Montgomery does not
apparently challenge this contention in her Reply Brief. In
our view, the fact that the allegedly ―phony‖ trial did not even
concern a treatment regimen that her doctor prescribed to her
is dispositive. There is no allegation of fact that supports a
connection between Schering‘s unlawful conduct of involving
Dr. Willis in a ―phony‖ trial, and Montgomery‘s prescription
for a different drug therapy.
Montgomery‘s other arguments are equally
unpersuasive.
She contends that the Court ―unfairly
rebuke[d] [her] for not ‗directly accusing her doctor of a
crime—i.e., engaging in a phony clinical trial—and
defrauding his patients and the government.‖ (Montgomery
Br. at 27.) She also invokes Rule 11 to argue that her lawyers
were not permitted to make such an allegation about Dr.
Willis at this time. (Id. at 28.) She continues: ―[t]he
fundamental problem with the district court‘s dismissal is that
the court required some direct accusation of criminal conduct
by a non-party at the pleading stage. It was wrong to do so.‖
(Id.)
This argument misconstrues the District Court‘s
analysis, which did not require the MAC to charge Dr. Willis
with a crime. Rather, the Court considered the allegation that
the trial was ―phony‖ to be conclusory because there was
simply no other allegation in the MAC to support the
assertion that this particular trial was in fact a disguised
bribery scheme. To satisfy the standard, the MAC would not
have to allege that Dr. Willis had committed a crime, but state
factual allegations suggesting that the clinical trial was in fact
somehow fraudulent or undertaken in bad faith.
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Montgomery argues that the MAC contains allegations
that support the claim that the trial was ―phony,‖ including an
allegation citing to a memorandum from one of the qui tam
relators, a Schering employee who stated that ―his job is
secure‖ in part because he had ―over 50 [Hepatitis] trials
underway.‖ (Montgomery Br. at 30, citing MAC ¶ 94-95.)
This general assertion that 50 Hepatitis clinical trials were
underway, however, does not support the conclusion that Dr.
Willis‘s trial was one of those phony trials. These allegations
therefore do not ―bolster the main allegation‖ that Dr. Willis
was involved in a ―phony‖ clinical trial. (Id. at 30.)
Montgomery points to no other factual allegations in
the MAC that support the conclusion that Dr. Willis was in
any way connected with phony trials. The allegation
therefore does appear to be a speculative conclusion that falls
short of stating facts that raise a ―plausible‖ right to relief.
We conclude that the Court did not err in rejecting the
assertion, without other supporting factual claims, that Dr.
Willis was involved in a phony clinical trial. See Morse v.
Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)
(holding that a court reviewing a complaint need not credit
―bald assertions‖ or ―legal conclusions‖).
The MAC also claimed that three other Scheringsponsored programs associated with Montgomery‘s treatment
under Dr. Willis were the causal link between his prescription
and Schering‘s false marketing campaign. First, the MAC
alleges that a Schering-paid nurse in Dr. Willis‘ office,
identified in the MAC as ―D.S.‖ or ―Diana S.,‖ was part of
the marketing scheme that affected her treatment. (MAC ¶
42-25.) The Court held that this allegation that Diana S. ―was
part of Schering‘s deceitful marketing scheme and somehow
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caused Dr. Willis to prescribe Rebetol/PEG-Intron to
Montgomery is purely conclusory.‖ (A. 119.) The Court
reasoned that, at most, it could accept as true the alleged
facts, which stated that this nurse was paid by Schering to
provide patient support in matters concerning injectiontraining and side effects; however, the Court concluded,
―there is no indication that Schering executed the alleged
misrepresentations or kickbacks through this PCC.‖ (A. 119.)
The MAC makes numerous allegations about ―Diana
S.‖ based on ―information and belief‖; it never explains,
however, the basis for its conclusion that she was in fact
employed by Schering, or that she disseminated any false
information to Dr. Willis about the Subject Drugs. In our
view, the MAC fails to allege sufficient facts to ―show‖ that
her treatment plan was influenced by Diana S. at the behest of
Schering.
The District Court also discredited the MAC‘s
allegations with respect to two other Schering-sponsored
programs, the ―Access Assurance Program‖ and ―Be in
Charge Program.‖ According to the MAC, the ―Access
Assurance Program‖ supported patients who were undergoing
treatments by the Subject Drugs by ensuring they had a
consistent supply of the product, and also allegedly to serve
as a marketing technique. (MAC ¶ 48-51.) Similarly, the
―Be in Charge‖ program was designed to help support
patients on Rebetron therapy by providing them with a nurse
to ensure ―such patients were ‗compliant‘‖ with the therapy
program, so that Schering could ―ensure that [it] sold as much
Rebetron Combination Therapy as possible.‖ (MAC ¶ 52.)
However, the MAC provides no factual allegations describing
how either of these programs interfered with Dr. Willis‘
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decision to prescribe Montgomery the Subject Drugs through
any false information, or that it gave her any false claims
about the drugs that otherwise injured her. Accordingly, we
conclude that these allegations are not sufficient to form the
necessary causal nexus.
Montgomery also raises a handful of other claims that
are ultimately unavailing. She argues that the MAC properly
pleaded causes of action for statutory consumer fraud,
common law conspiracy, aiding and abetting and unjust
enrichment. (Montgomery Br. at 45.) Montgomery argues
that the Court should have evaluated her standing to bring the
claims with regard to each particular claim, and notes that
other than a brief discussion of the Washington Consumer
Protection Act, the Court‘s opinion contains ―no discussion of
the elements of the plaintiff‘s four claims, or the sufficiency
of her allegations of the same in the MAC.‖ (Id. at 46.) She
requests that we vacate the decision and remand it ―for failure
to adequately address the first step of the requisite two-step
process under Rule 12.‖ (Id., quoting Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210
(―First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be
separated.‖)). Montgomery then proceeds to exhaustively
discuss how the MAC pleads all of the requisite elements of
each of her claims.
Montgomery‘s focus on the pleading standards for
each of her claims is secondary to the threshold issue that the
Court addressed when determining that the MAC did not
adequately allege an injury fairly traceable to Schering‘s
alleged misconduct. Although the MAC is replete with
factual allegations and indeed asserts them with greater
specificity than the TPP Complaint, they do not present a
plausible allegation actually linking Montgomery‘s injuries to
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any type of miscommunication or false claim about the drugs
that were actually prescribed to her. Accordingly, we will
affirm the Court‘s conclusion that the MAC failed to
adequately allege causation.
IV.
Neither appellant – Local 331 nor Montgomery – has
alleged facts sufficient to confer standing to seek relief for
Schering‘s marketing of certain drugs for off-label uses.
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court‘s rulings.
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